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9	PUBLIC STAKEHOLDER SESSION - SACRAMENTO
10	CONCERNING THE ACCESSIBLE DELETION MECHANISM
11	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION OF RECORDED PUBLIC MEETING
12	WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2024
13	LENGTH: 1:14:16
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15	AFTERNOON SESSION
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MR. LAIRD: All right. I think we can go ahead and get started if my colleagues agree. Well, hello, and good morning everybody. Welcome to the California Privacy Protection Agency Public Stakeholder session on the accessible delete mechanism that's implemented by SB 362.

My name is Phil Laird, I'm the general counsel for the Agency, and with me today is Liz Allen, an attorney with the legal division, and Serini -- Serena Marzion with our public affairs division. This session will be run until 2:00 p.m. And it will be recorded and a recording will be posted on our website at cppa.ca.gov.

Around noon, we are planning to take a 10 or 15 minute break, and if at 2:00 there are still attendees wishing to comment who have not had an opportunity to, we are available to continue this session past that time after another short break.

This session does cap off a month long preliminary open comment period. All written comments received by the Agency are being actively reviewed, and we are grateful to everyone who took the time to submit their thoughts, concerns, and recommendations in writing in advance of this meeting.

Now, we're happy to have you here and we really look forward to your feedback after we've provided a quick overview of the law and where we are in the early stages of



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this rulemaking process. So we'll move on to the next slide, please.

So, first, lawyers have a good disclaimer. Just please note a few things. Senate Bill 362, which is also commonly referred to as the Delete Act, and you'll hear us refer to that -- refer to it as that throughout this meeting, authorizes the Agency to make rules to help implement and administer the law. That said, the Agency has not actually yet drafted regulations about the accessible deletion mechanism, which doesn't come into effect until January 1, 2026.

Now, this session is intended to gather that early stakeholder input about this accessible delete mechanism, which we are now referring to is the Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform or DROP for short. And to hear your thoughts about policy, technical, and consumer access considerations.

This presentation does not implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforce or administered by the Agency, and it is not legal advice. So businesses watching today should consult the statute in effect regulations and/or an attorney before taking any action to ensure compliance with the law.

Let's see. Next slide, please. So, quickly, I'll just give you a brief overview about who we are and why

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we're here discussing this today. So, although I anticipate most of you're familiar with our Agency, I'll just for anybody that is not.

We are here on behalf of the California Privacy Protection Agency, which was created by a Belt initiative passed in 2020, Proposition 24, and we are in fact the first exclusive privacy regulator in the country. We have, sort of, a variety of functions the law tasks us with carrying out.

But broken down sort of most simply, the three key roles of our Agency are this; it's rulemaking, issuing rules to implement legal requirements, which we are discussing today. It's promoting public awareness, information and guidance to both consumers and businesses about the law. We administer, enforce.

And auditing and enforcement. And so auditing businesses for compliance, initiating investigations, and enforcement actions when necessary to ensure compliance with the law by businesses covered by the CPPA. The rulemaking activities sit in the legal division of the Agency, which is in part why Liz and I are here with you today. And the legal division houses that team and we are overseeing the implementation of SB 362.

So with that all in mind, we can move to the next slide and I'm going to pass things on over to Ms. Allen.



Ms. Allen.

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MS. ALLEN: All right. Thank you so much, Phil.

Yes, so let's start with what is a data broker? A data broker under SB 362, the law we're discussing today, of course, is a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties, the personal information of a consumer, with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.

Certain types of data broker activity, which are covered by other privacy laws, are exempt, including, like for example, activity under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, known as FCRA, or the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, or CMIA.

Research shows that data brokers are largely unknown to the public because by definition these businesses don't have a direct relationship with consumers. Because of this, the average Californian consumer doesn't know what a data broker is, let alone the name or the website of a data broker, where they could go and exercise their privacy rights.

So, what does the Delete Act do about these data brokers? So the Delete Act contains two programs. The first is the data broker registry. The State of California has actually maintained a registry since 2020. It was originally housed in Department of Justice and SB 362 transferred the registry to the Agency starting on January

1st of this year.

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The law requires that any business that meets the definition of data broker in the previous year, they must register with the Agency, which includes paying a registration fee. The registry with over 500 data brokers is up and running. You can find it at cppa.ca.gov/data_broker_registry, which is all one word. And you can find our list.

You can sort by which data broker has certain types of data such as reproductive healthcare data, data on miners, or precise geolocation. The entire list is also available for download. The second part of this bill is the accessible deletion mechanism, which we're calling DROP.

And this is a mandate for the Agency to essentially build a one-stop shop for consumers to request the deletion of their non-exempt personal information from all the data brokers registered within the State of California. So this stakeholder session is just about this second program, about the deletion mechanism itself.

So that brings us to the question of what is this deletion mechanism? So the deletion mechanism allows the consumer through a single verifiable request to request that every data broker that maintains any personal information. It's really that personal information related to that -- to that consumer held by, not only the data broker, but also

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our associated service providers and contractors.

This is the first of its kind deletion platform nationally or internationally. And it's similar to its cousin, which many people are familiar with, the Do Not Call Registry. So we hope that the platforms helps consumers to quickly and easily exercise their deletion and opt-out rights.

As you've heard, we are referring to this platform as the DROP because it's more descriptive and more clear for consumers to understand, so Delete Request and Opt-Out Platform. The platform importantly enables consumers not only to delete their personal information, but the law requires that if a data broker cannot delete the personal information of the consumer, that the consumer's information be opt-out -- opted out of sale or sharing.

So just to give you a quick visual of how this would work. This is kind of how the law dictates that we run this. So the consumer, can make a request to us either individually by going to our website, or they can make a request through an authorized agent.

An authorized agent is a person or business entity that a consumer has authorized to act on their behalf. So, for example, sooner a consumer may sign up, they may pay a subscription service that -- to a -- to a company that makes deletion requests on their behalf.

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The Agency processes those requests, and data brokers must access the DROP, the platform, every 45 days to ensure they have an updated list of all deletion requests from California consumers.

So some of the features of this platform is that it's a free -- it's free, and consumer information will be submitted and processed in a secure and privacy protecting manner. Consumers can make a delete request of all data brokers, or they can choose a narrower set of specific data brokers they would like to send a request to.

For example, a consumer could decide to make a deletion request only to data brokers who hold reproductive healthcare data. The platform will also allow consumers to verify the status of their requests. It will be accessible to those with disabilities, and it will also allow consumers to alter their requests 45 days after making the initial request.

Data brokers also have certain requirements under the law. They must register, which includes paying a registration fee annually for every year that -- after they meet the definition of a data broker. In August 1st, 2026, the data brokers must access the drop -- access the drop and process all deletion requests within 45 days.

In the case where a data broker cannot process the deletion request, the data -- because the consumer cannot be

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verified, the data broker must process the request as an opt-out of sale or sharing of the consumer's personal information. They must also direct their service providers and contractors to do the same.

The Agency may charge the data brokers a fee to access DROP -- the DROP, and the data brokers must update their public disclosures July 1st every year to report about the previous calendars year activity. That same information will be reported to the Agency during their annual registration.

And starting in 2028, they will -- all data brokers must undergo an independent audit every three years to ensure compliance with this law So that's a lot of different dates, a lot of different times. Let's make that a little bit easier to see and understand.

So here's where we are. The law was signed last year in October by Gavin Newsom. We opened the data broker registry in January 1st -- July 1st next week. Data brokers must post certain public disclosures. January of 1st, 2026, consumers may access the DROP and start making a single deletion request -- or make deletion requests.

August 1st, 2026, data brokers must start accessing the DROP system at least one time every 45 days. And then 2028 starting January 1st, data brokers must undergo an audit by an independent third party every three



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years to determine compliance with the law.

And as a reminder of where we are in this world, in between 2024 and 2026, we will be writing DROP regulations and building a system. And the rulemaking we are discussing today will be written and introduced to the board over the next year. We intend to include -- complete this rulemaking in -- by 2026.

All right. And I think that kind of gives you the overview of the law and the requirement, so I'm going to pass it back to Phil to get to talk briefly about the rulemaking process.

MR. LAIRD: Thanks, Liz. That was super helpful overview, and I promise everybody we're just going to talk a little bit longer. Of course, the point of this session is to actually hear from all of you.

But to give you a brief overview of sort of what the rulemaking process is for California and for our Agency, again, as Liz has stated and I stated earlier, we have not actually drafted regulations, so you didn't miss something. There's not draft regulations that you should be aware of on this topic yet.

This really is a preliminary session to start hearing feedback from all of you about what those regulations and how this should look like, what the system should look like, and what the experience should be for



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consumers and data brokers alike.

So, within the rulemaking process though, we are in that preliminary stage, step 1, which essentially will help inform how we draft the regulations. And then once we've drafted regulations, we will then in fact bring them to our board. We are overseen by five member board, and it will be up to the board to make decisions about final text and any major policy decisions within sort of the framework of what we're proposing.

And this, the board could go through multiple rounds of sort of discussing, right, the proper sort of scope and balance of requirements here. But after all of that is when we'd finally moved to step 2, formal room making. So once the board has landed on a set of texts that they would like to formally start as the kind of initial proposal for public consideration and for their consideration, the Agency would publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, which commences with a minimum 45-day period -- public comment period during which time you will have an opportunity again to submit comments in writing or verbally.

This officially begins the formal rulemaking process. Once the Agency reviews and responds to all public comments, then the board will have the opportunity to either decide, yes, we got the text right, we're going to go ahead and adopt these regulations, or to further modify the text

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and make additional amendments based on, you know, information received during public comment or new concerns that arise through that process.

But nevertheless, at some point the process ends and the board will decide on a final set of regulations that they will vote to adopt, and that's when we'll move to step 3, which is when we submit our final rulemaking package to the Office of Administrative Law.

OAL, Office of Administrative Law, has 30 working days to review the rulemaking record and proposed regulations for compliance with the APA, the Administrative Procedures Act. And if OAL approves the regulatory text, it will file the text with the Secretary of State, which is printed in the California Code of Regulations, and typically takes effect within a quarter year. Although those timelines can change dependent on a variety of factors.

Next slide, please. So, finally, although today you're already doing a great job at figuring out participation and sort of a rulemaking process and providing public comment just by being here, by watching and perhaps by providing public comment today, but some tips as you continue to monitor this process going forward.

First of all, you can always subscribe to our e-mail list to receive updates on our rulemaking and upcoming board meetings, and we've provided the sub -- the



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subscribe link here on this screen, and it's easy to find on our website as well at cppa.ca.gov.

Secondly, you can attend our board meetings and our public hearings. The agenda for these are always posted on the website, and you can also watch recordings of our past meetings. And to be clear, you know, you're always welcome as the board deliberates on these issues if it's on an agenda, to provide public comment at that stage, even if formal rulemaking hasn't started.

But then, again, as I discussed earlier, once formal rulemaking begins, there is always a formalized opportunity for public comment during that period as well. And finally, you can, of course, submit public comments.

And so when doing that, as I mentioned, you could do it perhaps during a board meeting before the rulemaking process begins, but you can also do it during this period, informal rulemaking, either by writing it through submission to the Agency or at a hearing where you could sit, submit written comments or oral comments much like we're hosting today.

So with that said, that essentially concludes our presentation to just give you some understanding of where we are today and what we're talking about. But again, the overwhelming purpose of today's meeting is to really hear from all of you.

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We understand there's quite a few people interested in potentially making public comment today. So like we've done in other forms, we will open it up and Serena will kind of discuss -- tell you about the ins and outs of how to raise your hand and make a comment during the session today.

For the time being, we will be limiting public comments to three minutes per person just to make sure we can accommodate everybody in our time today. But that said, if at the end we -- we've -- we still have time left, we would invite folks to come back and continue comments if they had more statements to make. But for now, we will be maintaining a three-minute limit.

So with no further ado, I'll turn it over to Serena to kind of moderate our public comment session. And I just want to say again in advance, thank you so much for being here today. We're really looking forward to hearing your feedback.

MS. MARZION: Okay. Thank you, Phil.

So we are now open for public comment. To make a public comment at this time, please raise your hand using the raised hand feature or by pressing star nine, if you're joining us by phone. I'll call your name and unmute you when it's your turn to speak. You'll have three minutes and I'll give you a thirty second warning.

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So right now I have Michelle Smith. I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you are ready. Oh, it looks like Michelle is no longer has her hand raised.

So then I will move on to Serge Egelman. Go ahead and speak when you're ready.

MR. EGELMAN: Sure. Serge Egelman, I'm a researcher at UC Berkeley. In my research I've found that it's quite difficult for determining what companies are even regulated by CCPA since most of the, you know, the threshold requirements are non-public information, such as how many consumers are in California or what their revenues are from, you know, data from from California residents.

And so my question really is, what's going to be done to ensure that companies that should be registering as data brokers actually are since, again, you know, like those threshold requirements don't seem to be, you know, apparent to the general public?

One suggestion that I made to my state rep was that, you know, maybe there could be -- you know, the law could be amended to add a requirement such that each of these companies as part of their statement of information checks a checkbox that discloses that they are regulated under CCPA.

Since many companies -- you know, any company



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doing business in the state of California has to file one of 1 these annually anyway, adding a single checkbox to that 2 effect would make it a lot easier to try and figure out 3 4 who's being -- who should be regulated under CCPA. That's 5 really the extent of my comment. 6 MS. ALLEN: Serena, I think you're muted. I think 7 you called the next speaker, but I think you're muted. MS. MARZION: Thank you. That was going to be 8 Brian May. I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll 9 have three minutes. Please begin as soon as you're ready. 10 MR. MAY: Yeah, I've done a lot of work around the 11 12 question of deletion requests. And from the perspective of 13 a data broker, one of the more complex aspects of it is 14 trying to identify what data needs to be deleted, and from a 15 consumer's perspective, trying to identify -- how to 16 identify to the data broker what data needs to be deleted. 17 The analogy with Do Not Call list is adequate up to the point at which a Do Not Call list is a single phone 18

to the point at which a Do Not Call list is a single phone number, which is removed from the call list of brokers with something like a -- an online identifier that can be anything from the half a dozen e-mail addresses that I have to my phone number to something that is pseudonymous generated by various algorithms to a random value placed into a cookie.

And I'm trying to understand, what is the scope of



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the platform in terms of the requirements for being able to communicate up from the perspective of a consumer? This is the data that is mine, that identifies me. And from the perspective of a data broker, how do we figure out how to take the inputs from the consumer, how to appropriately address the data that we have, and how do we appropriately communicate the data that we need to have our partners address to our partners? That's it.

MS. MARZION: Thank you very much. Matt Schwartz, I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Good morning. My name is Matt Schwartz, policy analyst at Consumer Reports based on Washington DC. Thank you to the Agency for taking up this important rulemaking to implement the Delete Act, which is critical legislation to reign in the data broker industry that for over the last 20 years has been able to collect incredibly detailed profiles of almost every single American, in most cases, without their knowledge or explicit consent.

It's long past time that consumers are provided with more control over the information these entities can collect and use about them. Along with several privacy groups, we submitted written comments in response to the

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Agency -- Agency's call for preliminary comments on the proposed rulemaking. So I won't repeat all of those arguments here, but I do think it's important to stress a few points.

First, we believe that the Agency should adopt the position that in general there should be a low bar for identity verification when consumers seek to use the accessible deletion mechanism to send a deletion request.

The Delete Act is scoped fairly narrowly to focus on data broker data that's primarily used for marketing purposes. And as such, we don't believe there is a high risk of harm from mistaken deletion requests. Whereas because of data brokers inherently privacy eroding business model, there is a high risk of harm from not deleting a consumer's record.

We believe a consumer should be considered verified when the Agency can either authenticate their e-mail address or their phone number, and that a data broker should be required to delete any information reasonably associated with the consumer's profile that includes one of those identifiers.

Second, we believe that the Agency should center any rulemaking around the notion that the accessible deletion mechanism should be as easy for consumers to use as possible. That includes minimizing the information that

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consumers should be required to include with their deletion request, ensuring that consumers can rely on authorized agents to send requests on their behalf if they desire, and ensuring that data brokers cannot respond to requests sent through deletion mechanism with individualized responses to consumers.

The last thing that we'd want is the consumer's universal deletion requests, resulting in hundreds of emails from data brokers asking for consumers to verify additional information to confirm that they're sure about the deletion requests, or to ask them to whitelist them from the -- from the deletion request.

In our experience as operating as an authorized agent under -- with permission slip, data brokers have taken advantage of verification processes to ask for extraneous information that was not actually necessary to complete the request, and have on occasion seemed to have misused information submitted with the request for secondary purposes. And so we should insulate consumers from those harms as much as possible.

With that, thanks again so much for your consideration of our views and we look forward to continuing to work with the Agency to ensure the strongest possible implementation of the Delete Act.

MS. MARZION: Thank you very much, Matt.



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Okay. Travis Frazier, you'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. FRAZIER: Good morning. My name is Travis
Frazier and I represent the Association of National
Advertisers. We are the country's largest and oldest
advertising trade association representing more than 20,000
brands, along with numerous nonprofits, small businesses,
universities, and others from the ad industry.

I want to first say that we strongly believe in protecting consumers through meaningful privacy protections, reasonable laws, and strong self-regulation. As the Agency begins its rulemaking under SB 362, we did, however, want to highlight several areas where possible unforeseen consequence -- consequences could occur as a part of this rulemaking.

First, under the CCPU -- on first, under the CCPA regulations, if a consumer uses an authorized agent to submit a deletion request, the business may require the agent to provide signed proof that the consumer gave the agent permission to submit the request in addition to asking the consumer to directly confirm their identity with the business, or directly confirm that they granted the agent permission to make the request.

We believe any proposed rules to implement the Delete Act must be consistent with the CCPA in order to



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allow for the efficient management and processing of deletion requests made through the DROP. We also believe the Agency should ensure authorized agents are held to the same standards that data brokers and the Agency are held to when they describe available rights to individuals.

Finally, the regulation should prohibit authorized agents from making secondary uses of data they receive from consumers, or charging consumers to submit requests when this would otherwise be free. Additionally, the Agency should draft rules that permit data brokers to independently verify consumer requests to ensure consumers are the individuals seeking to exercise rights under the law. This is an area we've see -- we have seen addressed in the CPRA.

Next, under the California Delete Act, data and entities subject to certain federal laws are exempt from the scope of the accessible deletion mechanism. In addition, the statute includes other relevant exceptions for requests submitted through the DROP, such as exceptions relating to maintaining data for security and integrity purposes. The Agency should ensure that it makes these exemptions clear to consumers on the main webpage that houses the DROP.

Finally, the Agency has publicized draft regulations indicating that it is contemplating changes to the legally defined term data broker under California law by changing the definition of direct relationship. As



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proposed, the definition of direct relationship would mean the term data broker would likely cover every business in California.

As sale is defined extremely broadly in the CCPA, and virtually every business collects personal information from third party sources other than the consumer themself. We urge the Agency to draft rules that do not incorporate this proposed definition of direct relationship, which goes beyond the scope and intent of the law.

Thank you, and we look forward to continuing to engage with the Agency as you promulgate these regulations.

MS. MARZION: Thank you, Travis.

Next we'll have Chris Deatherage. I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you are ready.

MR. DEATHERAGE: Hi, my name is Chris Deatherage. I'm an attorney who represents marketing companies within the space. I'm going to keep my comment just to the practical reality of small businesses that would fall under the data broker definition.

Just be aware that there are a number of businesses out there that wouldn't fall under what people would generally, particularly the public, consider a data broker. You know, the Cambridge Analyticas of the world that amass all the data you can ever imagine, know what you

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did since the day you were born.

There are a number of small entities out there that just gather and by very targeted data for very specific purposes, like providing consumers with quotes for services and the like. A lot of these organizations are not necessarily the most technologically sophisticated.

So I think it is very important that the Agency makes sure that the process is ideally through an API or some type of CSV file that's easily fulfillable and manipulated by the organizations so that they can alleviate any technical — technological issues on their end when it comes to fulfilling requests.

And while I think it is important that consumers have an easy time submitting these deletion requests, I have an easy time submitting these deletion requests, I have personally seen clients of mine that have set up easy to use forms that have been abused by unscrupulous actors to submit requests in mass. And I mean, going from 50 a month to 50,000 a day.

These requests have spoof IP addresses, usually the same handful of spoofed IP addresses. I cannot speculate as to who or the motivation behind submitting these, but it can be incredibly detrimental to a small business to have entire swaths of consumers blocked from doing business with them, essentially, based off of likely

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no knowledge from that consumer at all.

This is a very political charged situation, so there's any number of bad actors who could possibly take advantage of that. So, again, while it should be as simple as possible, I would say to submit these requests, there does need to be verifiable mechanisms such as two-factor authentication or something that might be implemented to ensure that the consumer, who the request is being submitted on behalf of, actually wanted that request to be submitted.

MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds.

MR. DEATHERAGE: And that's it for my comment.

MS. MARZION: Thank you so much, Chris.

Next we have David LeDuc. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. LEDUC: Hi, my name is David LeDuc and I'm the vice president for public policy for the Network Advertising Initiative. Thank you for holding this preliminary process to seek stakeholder feedback. The NAI is the leading nonprofit self-regulatory association for advertising technology companies, and for over 20 years, we've promoted the highest voluntary industry standards for the responsible collection and use of consumer data for advertising and marketing.

The NAI submitted detailed written comments



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yesterday, providing technical and operational recommendations, and I will just summarize those comments today. Our overarching goal is to help the Agency implement a user-friendly platform that effectively serves both consumers and registered data brokers.

After thoroughly considering the challenges and benefits of multiple approaches for the Agency, the NAI recommends that the Agency play a critical role in authenticating individuals who submit requests through the DROP before making those requests available to brokers.

If the Agency launches the DROP without properly authenticating individuals, the result will be a confusing and inefficient process for both consumers and registered data brokers. This would lead to an undesirable alternative that we refer to as the individualized consumer authentication problem.

A scenario whereby each of the 500 plus registered data brokers would be forced to authenticate each individual making a request through the DROP. Specifically, the NAI recommends the Agency perform the following two essential authentication procedures.

First, to determine if the request comes from a California consumer, and second, to determine that the consumer has ownership or control over specific identifiers the individual submits in connection with the request.

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Further, regarding pseudonymous identifiers, which are widely used by NAI members and across the digital advertising industry for their benefit they provide to consumer privacy, we offer additional recommendations. We urge the Agency to carefully consider how it will handle authentication of pseudonymous identifiers and treat these in a different manner, including identifiers such as device IDs, cookie IDs.

One of the biggest potential challenges to ensuring authenticated consumer requests is the role that authorized agents established by the Delete Act play under the law. Therefore, it is imperative that the Agency distinguish between determining whether an authorized agent is eligible to assist in the individual and -- to assist an individual in making request through the DROP from whether the Agency has authenticated the individual whom the authorized agent is acting on behalf of.

Ultimately, the risk of the DROP becoming subject to fraud and abuse is just too high if the Agency seeds the task of authenticating those individuals and the specific identifiers to these authorized agents where neither the --

MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds.

MR. LEDUC: -- nor the brokers would have sufficient transparency into the authentication process. So the NAI urges the Agency to perform the additional layer of



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authentication for these individuals submitted for both the benefit of consumers and registered brokers.

We offer some additional recommendations in our comments and appreciate once again taking the opportunity to solicit feedback. We look forward to working with the Agency and other stakeholders as you move this process forward. Thank you.

MS. MARZION: Thank you, David.

Next we have Haley. I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MS. TSUKAYAMA: Hello, my name is Haley Tsukayama and I'm associate director of legislative activism at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. We were strong supporters of the California Delete Act and signed onto comments with a number of civil society groups submitted yesterday.

I'll keep my remarks brief, but I mostly would like to underscore that as mentioned in those comments, we believe there should not be too high a bar for consumers to meet when it comes to identity verification under this law.

In cases where, you know, a request comes directly from a consumer visiting the accessible deletion mechanism, we believe the request should be considered verifiable when either an e-mail address or a phone number can be authenticated by the Agency.

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The goal of the original bill was to make

California's landmark privacy law more usable for consumers.

The deck -- the deck is often stacked against individual people who do not have time to go after all of these companies and ask them for their information and ask them to delete their information.

And so we want to make sure that the regulations follow in the spirit of the intent of the bill and to make it very easy for people to exercise their privacy rights. Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment.

MS. MARZION: Next we have, Aleecia. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MS. MCDONALD: Thank you so much for taking the time to listen to our comments today. My name is Aleecia McDonald. I'm an academic mostly associated with Carnegie Mellon. And for five years I've been assigning my students the task of sending delete and opt-out requests as early as September 2018 before there was even force of law behind the CCPA.

So I've watched as students have tried to exercise their rights as Californians. What we've seen is that asking for additional personally identifiable information has a chilling effect and it decreases willingness to exercise their constitutional rights for privacy. Moreover,



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the following circumstances kept happening.

A student would visit a website directly from a data broker, and they would then be asked for their name or e-mail address or phone number, some other PII to authenticate, but the data broker holds the data about that student in pseudonymous form.

So the data broker would come back and say, well, there's no match, so there's nothing to delete. There's no data for you that we hold because the data are pseudonymous. So the data broker continues to collect and sell data based on technical identifiers like http cookies or browser fingerprinting, rather than have it linked to the PII that they ask for.

So I would posit that if a company can identify a user well enough to profit from seeing that user again uniquely, that they should also be able to fulfill the constitutional privacy rights that users have. This poses challenges for the way that DROP is architected and thought about normally.

So what I would suggest is that we need to think about how we will also interact with pseudonymous data that might, for example, mean authorized agents using redirects, which we normally think of as privacy invasive rather than privacy enhancing.

I would also posit that since companies don't need

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additional authentication, like driver's licenses, to collect data about their users and sell that data, in fact they're not even their users, that that implementation is not appropriate also for deletion, that the technologies that companies are using for the data collection and sales side should also be sufficient for the delete and opt-out.

So I thank you again for your time. I have additional thoughts and comments filed, but I really want to highlight this and also highlight the issue that we have children who are not being considered. They do not need to opt-out. They have opt-in. We need to think about how we handle children and their parents as well under this system. Thank you very much for your time.

MS. MARZION: Thank you so much, Aleecia.

If there are any other members of the public like to speak at this time, please go ahead and raise your hand using the Zoom's "raised hand" feature or by pressing star six if you're joining us by phone.

Kale Smith, I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. K. SMITH: Hi, I'm Kale Smith from Roku worked on the IAB Tech Labs working group which has just finalized a data deletion standard, the data deletion request framework, which I believe is actually well suited to

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potentially be the protocol to communicate deletion requests from the CPPA to various data brokers.

And so I would just like to advocate that, you know, there -- there's a standard that is fresh and then ready to be adopted by the rest of the industry, and I think this is a good opportunity to encourage further adoption and reach a critical mass where it becomes, you know, used beyond just the advertising use cases, but into data brokers as well.

There are some areas of the standard that I think could be updated. There's, you know, some considerations where it was initially drafted for real time communication.

I think the DROP is centered around more of a batch kind of processing, so I think there's maybe some areas that potentially could be extended.

But the standard itself is extensible, and I think that even just with some minor tweaks, it could suffice with some of the requirements here. There are some other areas around, you know, authentication and user identity that are purposely vague in the standard, but I think that actually enables, you know, flexibility with being able to interoperate with however data brokers are able to identify a user.

So I think it's something that is worth looking into, and I'm sure we'll talk later as I've already



submitted some written comments as well on the matter. 1 Anyways, that -- that's all I wanted to say for now. 2 MS. MARZION: Thank you very much. 3 Okay. If there are any other members of the 4 5 public who'd like to speak at this time, please go ahead and 6 raise your hand using Zoom's "raised hand" feature or pressing star nine if you're joining us by phone. 7 Michelle Smith, I'm going to unmute you at this 8 time. You have three minutes. Michelle Smith, go ahead and 9 speak when you're ready. 10 MS. M. SMITH: Hello, thank you for the opportunity 11 12 to speak. I am Michelle Smith, a US-based private sector certified information privacy professional candidate and a 13 14 member of the International Association of Privacy 15 Professionals. I've spent the last several years in 16 corporate information security like cybersecurity and risk 17 management, becoming the in-house specialist on CCPA and CPRA, which have not yet evolved to have clear protections 18 in place for job seekers who apply through online channels. 19 20 The modern job application process is online and 21 applicants encounter, the cover letter upload phase, the 2.2 resume upload phase, the form fill parsing phase, the 23 voluntary self-identification gender, race, ethnicity and 24 veteran status aspect, and then the voluntary self-identification disability phase. There's also the 25

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phase of consenting to have data handled as a prerequisite to an application input being accepted as submitted.

What I'm finding is that there's a lot of ambiguity in terms of how data is being handled, and what I find concerning as an applicant is that I have to consent as part of the application process to even being considered for a screening.

And I find that there is no feedback in terms of what happens if a position is eliminated? What happens if I am rejected but not contacted? At what point do I have recourse and what recourse do I have to call back the information that I've submitted? Like what rights do I have? What process are in -- are in place to protect me from divulging information that can be used to undermine my privacy rights, I, future Michelle, you, future applicants?

So I -- I'm on here to express concern for applicants during this period of a lot of positions being open and yet a lot of people applying for positions, but where does the information go? And in terms of calling that back from those I submit information to, and then the business partners of those platforms, of those employers, of those third party recruiters.

That's my comment. Thank you so much.

MS. MARZION: Nicole Smith, I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your

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comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MS. N. SMITH: Hi, my name is Nicole Smith. I'll make this brief because I'm getting over a flu. I'm a privacy and cybersecurity counsel. I work in the private sector and have worked for both security companies, as well as marketing companies. And I want to echo some of the sentiments that have been expressed here on the phone call already, that the mechanism in order to activate the delete should be as simple as possible.

And to illustrate this, I'd like to tell you a little bit about how I went through this. Just trying to unsubscribe my mother, who just celebrated her 85th birthday, from a lot of unwanted marketing emails --

MS. MARZION: Nicole, we don't hear you at this point. Did you mute yourself?

MS. N. SMITH: -- simplified.

MS. MARZION: Oh, there you are.

MS. N. SMITH: Yeah. To keep things as streamlined and simplified, I think, so that we're also keeping in mind our older generations is key because they no longer have the same faculties. They can't read the same small print. They may not be as well versed with a cell phone, for instance, if you have that double factor authentication coming via cell phone text, that's not something that my mother could do at this point.

So and I'd also like to shed some light on the
harm of having a request accidentally submitted, because I
thought about that when someone raised it earlier. If there
is an accidental deletion, but request submitted without
thorough authentication, I'm trying to see what the actual
harm is.
We process them at every company that I've been
at, and our marketing teams are fairly responsible. They do
not want to reach out to people who find the marketing
unwanted and want to be respectful of consumer's wishes.
And I think that what when we're talking about
harm of an accidental request going through that wasn't
authenticated properly, we're not talking about
unsubscribing someone from
MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds.
MS. SMITH: notification services here. We're
talking about the behind the scenes sale of their data, the
behind the scenes sharing of data that makes an extra
e-mail marketing e-mail, right, or marketing telephone
call possible.
So I don't think that I really can still visualize
what, if any, harm truly exists if an inadequately
authenticated request in this mechanism goes through.
That's all I have to say. Thank you so much.
MS. MARZION: Thank you so much, Nicole.

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Okay. If there are any other members of the public who'd like to speak at this time, please go ahead and raise your hand using Zoom's "raised hand" feature or by pressing star six if you're joining us by phone.

MR. LAIRD: Well, thank you for all those comments received so far. We've -- we're here to keep this window open, understanding some folks may not have been able to join at the beginning, so we'll remain here in the presentation and look forward to hearing further comments, if there are any, throughout the rest of the morning and early afternoon.

So encourage those listening in, wanting to make a

So encourage those listening in, wanting to make a public comment, please do when you're prepared to do so.

Otherwise, we will be here sort of on standby until 2:00.

MS. MARZION: Jared, I'm going to unmute you this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. MOSCOW: Hi, my name is Jared Moscow. I work at the IAB Tech Lab. I can just echo some comments shared by Brian May and Kale Smith from Roku earlier. We just completed and released a data deletion request framework that was actually built and contributed to by many companies in the ad tech space, but there are also a lot of the companies that populate the existing data broker registry in California.

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valuable.

CPPA BOARD PUBLIC STAKEHOLDER SESSION And just would encourage the CPPA to review the 1 specification and reach out to the companies that kind of 2 overlap both lists and also the tech lab for any technical 3 4 exploration and understanding for what has been built and 5 kind of provided to the industry as a standard method for 6 communicating deletion requests between requesters and recipients. 7 I think there's a lot of potential use and 8 acceleration for the State of California in terms of making 9 this easier for the broker side of the equation as well. 10 Yeah, just wanted to include that on top of all the other 11

So that's all from my side. Thank you.

consumer feedback that's also been raised today, which super

MS. MARZION: Again, the public comment session will remain open until 2:00 today. So please be sure to raise your hand if you're using Zoom's "raised hand" feature or by pressing star six if you're joining us by phone.

Once again, that public comment will be open today until 2:00. And if you'd like to make a comment, please use your raised hand if you're on Zoom and star nine if you're going to be joining us by phone. Thank you.

Scott Rice, you'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

Scott Rice, please begin as soon as you're ready.

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MR. RICE: Thank you. I would like to ask for clarifications or requests that is part of the -- any new legislation regulation that there could be additional clarifications around the responsibilities of processors or any companies for that matter that fit within California's fairly broad definition of the term data broker, but companies that don't actually have consumer data.

There are certainly references to processors certainly in the, you know, the proposed regulations on the federal law. There's differentiation between a processor and someone who actually can -- who actually holds the content. But California's rule tends to cover processors within the term data broker, but there isn't a lot of clarification about what you do as a processor if you don't actually have data to remove.

The other thing I would love to see at some point in future regulations is a standardization of the requirement for privacy brokers who submit requests on behalf of consumers. Those would be companies like Incogni and Aura and the various companies that charge consumers a subscription for, you know, for forwarding a consumer's privacy data to the various, you know, various parties listed on the various data broker websites, including your registry. That's all. Thank you.

MS. MARZION: Thank you so much, Scott.



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Again, public comment today is open until 2:00. So if you'd like to make a comment, please raise your hand using the "raised hand" feature or by pressing star nine if you're joining us by phone. MR. WARREN: Are you able to hear me. MS. MARZION: Warren, yes. You have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready. MR. WARREN: Great. Thanks. I just want to -- I echo some of the statements said by other people. And the three areas that, you know, I hope get looked into as part of this is -- the first is enforcement of data brokers registering in California. I believe there are a number of them out there that qualify as far as how their business is run, the number of residents that they have data on would qualify them to have to be registered, yet they are not. So I'm interested in, you know, hopefully a mechanism for getting teeth behind being able to have them register. And the second, similar to the gentleman who just spoke previously, data brokers who may be more processors and they may say, we don't have data on you. We collect

spoke previously, data brokers who may be more processors and they may say, we don't have data on you. We collect public data available about you, but we don't -- we're not ourselves collecting data on you.

I think there -- it would be helpful to have a carve out or some additional language dedicated to them that



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if I were -- wanted to delete myself from them, it would prohibit them from getting that public data, something in that vein so that's not a loophole for them to continue using my data after I make a delete request.

And the third one, also similar to someone said earlier, about the need for the minimum amount of data needed to verify someone for delete. I think if there is some -- a way to get some standardized language of what should or would qualify because I have seen where here's my name, here's my age, here's my city, well, that's not enough information. I need your phone number, I need your e-mail.

And again, it seems like I have provided enough information to reasonably have you find me and delete me, and yet you are not. So those are just the areas I'd -- I want to bring up here. Thank you.

MS. MARZION: Thank you very much.

Again, we'll be taking public comment until 2:00. So if you'd like to make a comment, please go ahead and raise your hand using the Zoom's "raised hand" feature or by pressing star nine if you're joining us by phone.

Noah, I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

MR. WIEDER: Thank you. This is Noah Wieder with Searchbug. I'm the CEO. And I've been listening to the --

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some of the comments, and I just want to reiterate, some people really don't understand what a data processor, a data broker processor is.

We're a data broker processor. We don't go out and collect public information. Anytime someone comes to the website, whether it's a business or marketing company, or most -- mostly Fortune, you know, 500, 100 companies looking to verify or validate data, it's not something that we just go out to the public records and find information. So it's not like we can delete something we don't have.

Every time somebody looks something up, some of us have to go out to our -- to the other data providers and create a report or look at the information and validate it to make sure that it is who they say they are. So we don't have anything to delete, even if it's public record. So just to say, you know, to be able to find other data brokers or other people that are collecting information isn't necessarily true.

The other issue is authentication. Companies like -- I think it was Scott that was mentioning it, one of those clients right now is a company called AtlasMail. And out of New Jersey, they're using a law called Daniel's Law to inundate data brokers with tens of thousands of names to get them to opt-out of being, what's considered a covered person, without any verification from our standpoint. So we

don't really even know that they've been properly 1 authenticated. 2 So my concern is if it's a tool that others can 3 abuse, people are going to scrape data or buy lists and 4 5 submit them to this new tool that the CCPA has and basically inundated. I mean, there could be tens of thousands of 6 7 requests a day, and they could be valid, they could be 8 invalid, they could just be phone numbers. I mean, you know, we -- we've got -- we got a list 9 of a few thousand names and addresses and phone numbers, but 10 that ends up being tens of thousands of pieces of data that 11 12 we have to figure out how to block and not delete because we 13 don't own the data. So those are --14 MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds. 15 MR. WIEDER: -- those are the kind of mechanisms 16 that I think that the CCPA really needs to think about how to best authenticate where the data is coming from that --17 or the request is coming from. Thank you. 18 MS. MARZION: Thank you. 19

Nicole Smith, I'm going to unmute you at this time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready.

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MS. N. SMITH: Hi. Thank you again. This is my second comment, so thank you for hearing me again. I heard one of the last comments that was made, and it did remind me

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of a trend that I was noticing internally on the company side. We -- in the past couple of years, we have been -- so to remind everyone, again, I'm a privacy and cybersecurity lawyer. I've been doing privacy for 14 years, and then before that, litigation.

What I've noticed on the privacy side is a definite uptick in data subject requests that we get for deletion that we are unable to authenticate, meaning we don't even have the data in our systems. But the sheer volume of them makes us wonder, where are these coming from?

And they're always coming from the same few sources. And these are sources where -- I don't want to say the company's names, but they're generating these deletion requests and sending us an e-mail that's formatted with a person's name and e-mail address. And in the same e-mail, at the very bottom, they are pitching us their own solution to help us manage the volume of these deletion requests.

So they have -- they're creating a problem with the volume, and then they're pitching themselves as the solution. So I think that's something that may not come to this board's mind, but it is a reality that's out there, is with every change in the law, there's always some entities looking to make a business model out of it, right? And to create a need.

And that's what we're seeing with some of these

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deletion request companies, that they're pitching their own 1 services in order to handle the very volume that they create 2 by submitting false deletion requests. So I did want to 3 4 bring that to the panel or the board's attention that this 5 is a phenomenon that's actually going on. There's more than one company doing it, and, you 6 know, if the volume gets -- so I primarily work at B2B 7 companies in the cybersecurity world, but at B2C companies, 8 their volume is far greater. So they either have to create 9 an in-house solution to handle all of these requests, or 10 engage a third party vendor to handle it. 11 12 So I would like the board to be mindful of 13 entities that would leverage --14 MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds. 15 MS. N. SMITH: -- leverage the possibility of 16 sending these requests through unauthenticated. Sorry, still getting over flu. I want to make sure you can hear 17 me. And make sure that there's some accountability, right? 18 Because we don't want false reports going through at such a 19

Usually, it's the same vendor that's causing the problem that offers their services to help. Thank you very much.

volume that it cripples companies into having to engage a

third party vendor to handle this.

MS. MARZION: Thank you for your comment.



Again, we'll be here until 2:00. So if you'd like 1 to make a comment at this time, please raise your hand by 2 using the "raised hand" feature on Zoom, or by pressing star 3 nine if you're joining us by phone. 4 5 Thank you, Serge. I'm going to unmute you this 6 time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please begin as soon as you're ready. 7 MR. EGELMAN: Yeah. Serge Egelman, I spoke before. 8 I'm a researcher at UC Berkeley. I just wanted to follow up 9 on some of the comments about the volumes of requests. The 10 research literature that I'm aware of has documented that 11 12 these requests usually amount to, on the order of 100 or so 13 a year on average for companies. 14 If companies are receiving many more than that, I 15 think that would -- that information would probably be 16 helpful both to researchers, regulators, and policymakers. 17 Certainly, in the security space, many companies release voluntarily annual reports about various requests for access 18 to their data. 19 20 And so, you know, having companies release 21 information about the number of requests they receive in 2.2 this space I think would be very helpful to all of the above 23 parties. MS. MARZION: Serge, is that the end of your 24 25 comment?



1	MR. EGELMAN: Yes, it is. Sorry.
2	MS. MARZION: Okay. Thank you very much.
3	Okay. Again, we're here until 2:00. So if you
4	have any public comments you'd like to make at this time, go
5	ahead and raise your hand using the "raise hand" feature or
6	by press pressing star nine if you're joining us by
7	phone.
8	Craig, I I'm going to mute you at this time.
9	You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please
10	begin as soon as you're ready.
11	MR. ERICKSON: Hello, my name's Craig Erickson.
12	Thank you very much. I may have missed it earlier in the
13	presentation, but I was wondering how consumers are going to
14	be notified of fulfilment of their requests, especially when
15	they're opting out of a lot of different data brokers.
16	Are those going to be acknowledgements that are
17	sent, or some type of notification that's sent to either
18	authorized agents or consumers letting them know that their
19	requests were fulfilled? It's something that's very
20	important, and if I missed it, you know, hopefully I'll be
21	able to find it again in your slide materials.
22	That's the end of my comment. Thank you very
23	much.
24	MS. MARZION: Thank you so much.
25	Again, public comment will be will remain open

1	today until 2:00. So please raise your hand using Zoom's
2	"raised hand" feature or dial nine if you're joining us by
3	phone to make a comment. Thank you.
4	Justin, I'm going to unmute you at this time.
5	You'll have three minutes to make your comment. Please
6	begin as soon as you're ready.
7	MR. THOMAS: Thank you so much. Justin Thomas,
8	searchbug.com California data broker. Just kind of wanted
9	to echo some of the earlier comments regarding vetting and
10	authentication for opt-out requests. That would be one of
11	our biggest concerns, is just making sure that, you know,
12	2FA is employed or some sort of identity verification is
13	employed when accepting these opt-outs.
14	You know, as a small business becomes sort of a
15	labor issue to have, you know, people in place to process
16	these requests, just need to make sure that they are
17	properly vetted upon receipt. That's my only comment.
18	Thank you.
19	MS. MARZION: Thank you so much.
20	Hello, Michelle. I'm going to unmute you at this
21	time. You'll have three minutes to make your comment.
22	Please begin as soon as you're ready.
23	MS. M. SMITH: Great. Thank you, Liz.
24	I'm Michelle Smith. My second comment here based
25	on questions that I submitted late after 5:00 yesterday, and

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then some comments that I heard earlier today, which sparked a lot of great ideas that I'm hoping that maybe would be helpful.

So reading back on the prompts of what was sent out for these meeting invitations, what I'm seeing is -- what I'm referring to is the first prompt of verifiable consumer requests. So there are A, B, and C sections. So my commentary is going to refer to prompt number one, A and C.

So in the process of consumer request, how about if we have something fundamental like what's required is first name, last name, and one of the following options, like phone number or e-mail address or mailing address to receive the request confirmation.

This data should be able to be found on a credit report for cross-reference purposes, perhaps allowing the process for the consumer to pick which of the top three bureaus to pull verification information. Perhaps take note from the free annual credit report websites process, make the process as easy as requesting a fraud alert or a credit freeze.

And then there was a provocative and illuminating point made earlier about data tied to metadata like IP addresses. Just like the ease of the Do Not Call Registry, at least the spirit of the registry, can we aim for a do not

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data collect registry for device IP addresses also known as private IP addresses?

The user experience would be this, me, a

California resident or a consumer who does business with a

California entity, goes to CPPA website that identifies my

IP address -- my device's IP address, I consent to have the

device IP identified by the platform and I consent to have

that device IP included on the do not data collect registry.

This is device level opt-in.

Then request confirmation number popup appears.

I'm prompted to screen capture it, and I'm able to input that confirmation number into a platform to verify that my request is active. On the administrative side, the registry platform batch pushes these requests to the data brokers, maybe as ad hoc or maybe as a set cadence of hourly or daily.

There might be an opportunity to work with Security Expert Troy Hunt, who runs, Have I Been Pwned, so a consumer can determine if the requests are being honored and which data brokers are caught in data breaches involving the exfiltration of private IP addresses. So if you don't know about --

MS. MARZION: Thirty seconds.

MS. M. SMITH: -- Have I Been Pwned, you can go to that website and type in all of your e-mail addresses and

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determine whether they have been found in data exploits such as LinkedIn. There have been links of LinkedIn. What else? Evite, Adobe. I'm naming the ones that I know that I've been involved in.

But you type in any of your addresses, you can find whether your information is on -- the dark web has been found there. You can -- might even assume that it's being bartered, sold, traded but I think it would be a good idea for this ideal registry to partner with an existing registry in order to determine if anybody's involved in active breaches.

And I think it's also a good idea on a device level to opt-in to a do not contact, do not sell my data, do not track sort of registry. That's the end of my comment. Thank you.

MS. MARZION: Thank you very much.

Again, we're going to have public comment today until 2:00 p.m. So please raise your hand using the Zoom's "raised hand" feature or dial star nine to join by phone to make a comment. Thank you.

MS. ALLEN: Thanks so much everyone for joining us. We have about 15 minutes left in this public comment session. We will remain open until 2:00 p.m. I wanted to encourage folks to get their comments in if you have anything less -- left you'd like to share with us in this

next 15 minutes.

MR. LAIRD: Thank you for the long haulers who have continued to stay on with us until 2:00. We really appreciate you joining today's session, and we appreciate everybody who took the opportunity to provide comment both in writing over the past month, as well as today during this -- during this stakeholder meeting.

We look forward to continuing to work with everyone on this project and on these regulations as they develop, and we look forward to another time. I see we do have one more hand. Yes. Okay.

If, Liz, you can -- oh, the hand went away. Okay. I'm going to go ahead and assume that's all. We're at 2:00 now, so we'll go ahead and close down the session. Thank you again to everybody who participated, and please continue monitoring both our regulations e-mail, as well as our board meetings and other materials on our websites for updates on the continued development of the DROP system.

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